



United Nations Development Programme

JURISDICTIONAL REDD+ APPROACHES:

LESSONS FROM THE GOVERNORS' CLIMATE & FORESTS TASK FORCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From 2018 – 2020, UNDP, with funding from the Government of Norway, supported 35 states and provinces in the Governors' Climate & Forests Task Force (GCFTF) to develop and/or revise jurisdictional strategies and investment plans to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) and promote low-emissions development. Overall, these jurisdictions made significant strides in developing or improving the strategies and plans designed to achieve emissions reductions, while also laying the foundation for transformative change at scale. Nineteen states and provinces made progress towards developing a new REDD+ strategy or framework, while a further twelve made important improvements to existing policies. In addition, twelve GCFTF members developed a costed, time-bound investment plan to finance their REDD+ actions. Other jurisdictions took important steps in creating jurisdictional REDD+ systems, such as drafting new REDD+ and climate laws and regulations, reviving stakeholder forums, and developing safeguards frameworks.

The purpose of this review is to present the findings from a desk survey of the experience to date in these 35 jurisdictions, with a focus on illustrating lessons that can inform future REDD+ and low-emissions development planning and implementation in the GCFTF network and beyond. These findings were drawn from the final reports and independent evaluations from the 35 jurisdictions.

One of the principal findings was the **need for targeted, consistent capacity building support to civil servants, institutions, and civil society in subnational jurisdictions**. This finding is not new to development programming, nor is it specific to environmental governance or REDD+. However, it emphasises the need for these interventions to learn from previous efforts and to ensure that capacity building is integrated in a way that will result in tangible, measurable outcomes and positive impact for the individuals and institutions that need to govern and implement the policies developed. Moreover, it stresses the need for **careful consideration of capacity development approaches in the design of interventions**, in particular the way in which civil society partners are working with subnational governments to consciously build – and embed – capacity.

Other lessons that emerged included the **need to set and manage expectations from the beginning and the need to meet the persistent capability gaps with consistent support**. The review also confirmed many of the success factors that have

been highlighted in the literature on jurisdictional approaches, including the role of meaningful stakeholder engagement. In addition, the review outlines some of the best practices that were key to success, particularly in multistakeholder processes and **how to successfully engage Indigenous peoples and local communities**.

The first round of activities came to a close against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, which made implementation even more difficult. While this presented a significant challenge, this report does not view the results through the prism of the global health crisis and instead attempts to assess the outcomes independent of this additional hurdle, noting that in spite of difficulties, GCFTF members were able to achieve significant results. The success of specific initiatives and durability of results owes more to other external and internal factors, such as availability of resources, long-term capacity, and implementing partnerships, than to the global pandemic.

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BACKGROUND

In 2015, the Government of Norway pledged NOK 200 million (approximately USD 24 million) to the Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force (GCFTF) to support innovative GCFTF tropical forest states and provinces in their plans to implement the [Rio Branco Declaration](#). Norway was responding to the signal from subnational governments that were already doing more than their fair share in the effort to fight climate change, protect forests, and enhance livelihoods. The Rio Branco Declaration commits its signatories to reduce deforestation by 80% by 2020 if sufficient, long-term financial support is made available.

Launched in 2009, the GCFTF has grown from ten members from three countries (Brazil, Indonesia, and the United States), to 38 members across 10 countries. Of these, the 35 jurisdictions in tropical forest countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Côte d'Ivoire, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru) were eligible for and received funding under this pledge. This first round of funding (Window A) was to support GCFTF members to develop new or improve existing REDD+ or low-emissions development (LED) strategies and investment plans.¹

The network's theory of change starts from the premise that states and provinces (and subnational actors generally) are key players in the global effort to protect forests and fight climate change. They are doing much of the hard work associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation. Subnational jurisdictions represent an important, often decentralized, level of territorial governance that is closely connected to local realities, land use actors, and investments. These governments can often make more efficient use of resources by more precisely targeting REDD+ interventions. Additionally, initiatives at the jurisdictional level provide the opportunity to consolidate efforts and align interests across multiple stakeholders (government, business, communities) and sectors. Such approaches are not only essential to prevent leakage but also serve as important sources of experimentation and policy innovation.² The limitations of subnational approaches are evidenced by potential disconnects with national-level policies and politics, although the GCFTF works to ensure those links are made and that contributions at the subnational level are supporting national-level goals, including Nationally-Determined Contributions (NDCs).

UNDP's role was to support these member states and provinces, along with their selected civil society partners to develop or update their jurisdictional strategies and investment plans, putting them in a position to attract meaningful funding

¹ The 35 eligible jurisdictions: Brazil (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins); Peru (Amazonas, Huánuco, Loreto, Madre de Dios, Piura, San Martín, Ucayali); Colombia (Caquetá); Ecuador (Pastaza); Mexico (Campeche, Chiapas, Jalisco, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Yucatán); Indonesia (Aceh, Central Kalimantan, North Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Papua, West Papua); Côte d'Ivoire (Bélier, Cavally); Nigeria (Cross River State).

² This paragraph is taken from the Window A concept note, "Building Robust Jurisdictional Strategies and Investment Plans to Reduce Deforestation and Promote Low Emissions Development". Available at https://gcftf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/JurisdictionalStrategiesConceptNote_EN.pdf



Photo by: Joao Tzanno, Unsplash

and to catalyse transformation at scale. Moreover, UNDP aims to ensure these policies are connected to strategic national and international climate actions, including national REDD+ frameworks and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. The funding for activities was administered through civil society partners with previous experience and relationships with the GCFTF members.

While this review does not focus on the COVID-19 pandemic, its impact as the backdrop to Window A is undeniable. The COVID-19 pandemic caused significant disruptions across the globe but were felt particularly keenly in many GCFTF states and provinces. Travel and interaction – at the core of the GCFTF network – was restricted; states faced catastrophic health crises, particularly in Peru and Brazil; and jurisdictions with large Indigenous communities had to rethink their way of working to protect the most vulnerable. The global pandemic had a severe impact on the ability of states and provinces to finalise and validate their strategies and investment plans, though many reacted with agility to adopt new ways of working. Indeed, in many cases, the pandemic offered the opportunity for states to reduce travel costs and emissions by holding meetings online, including consultations, with UNDP's support to ensure that remote consultations with Indigenous peoples and local communities comply with social and environmental standards. Still, in many jurisdictions the pandemic overshadowed the environmental agenda, while budgets were diverted to address the crisis. Going forward, GCFTF jurisdictions have the additional challenge of ensuring that these strategies and investment plans contribute to the post-COVID-19 economic recovery and to demonstrate that climate action and the environmental agenda can support a greener, more productive recovery.

OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

Overall, the first round of funding (Window A) achieved its goals of supporting states to develop or update their jurisdictional REDD+/LED strategies and investment plans. Nineteen states and provinces developed a new REDD+ strategy or framework, while a further twelve made important improvements to existing policies. In addition, twelve GCFTF members developed a costed, time-bound investment plan to finance their REDD+ actions. Of the 35 jurisdictions that received funding, all but two (Papua and Madre de Dios) had completed activities at the end of December 2020, an extension on the original deadline that reflected the reality of working in the subnational context against a backdrop of administrative turnover, low capacity, and eventually the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 1 summarises the new and updated strategies and investment plans developed with Window A funding.

The Window A initiative has always recognised the divergent capabilities of GCFTF members as well as institutional and political contexts of this heterogeneous network. Window A was always intended to provide the flexibility for jurisdictions to identify their own needs, while recognising that there is no single pathway nor one-size-fits-all jurisdictional program design. Indeed, the funding window was designed to encourage new ways of thinking and develop new pathways

TABLE 1: WINDOW A STRATEGIES AND INVESTMENT PLANS

New REDD+ or LED Strategy * completed ** completed and approved	Updated REDD+ Strategy	New REDD+ Investment Plan
<p>Côte d'Ivoire</p> <p>Bélier**</p> <p>Cavally**</p>	<p>Mexico</p> <p>Campeche</p> <p>Jalisco</p> <p>Oaxaca</p> <p>Quintana Roo</p> <p>Yucatán</p>	<p>Nigeria</p> <p>Cross River State</p>
<p>Mexico</p> <p>Chiapas*</p> <p>Tabasco**</p>	<p>Peru</p> <p>San Martín</p> <p>Ucayali</p>	<p>Mexico</p> <p>Chiapas</p> <p>Jalisco</p>
<p>Ecuador</p> <p>Pastaza **</p>	<p>Brazil</p> <p>Acre</p> <p>Mato Grosso</p>	<p>Peru</p> <p>Amazonas</p> <p>Huánuco</p> <p>Loreto</p> <p>Piura</p> <p>San Martín</p> <p>Ucayali</p>
<p>Peru</p> <p>Amazonas*</p> <p>Huánuco*</p> <p>Loreto*</p> <p>Madre de Dios</p> <p>Piura*</p>	<p>Indonesia</p> <p>West Kalimantan</p> <p>East Kalimantan</p> <p>Central Kalimantan</p>	<p>Brazil</p> <p>Rondônia</p>
<p>Brazil</p> <p>Amazonas</p> <p>Pará**</p> <p>Maranhão</p> <p>Rondônia*</p> <p>Tocantins*</p>		<p>Indonesia</p> <p>Central Kalimantan</p> <p>West Papua</p>
<p>Indonesia</p> <p>Aceh*</p> <p>North Kalimantan</p> <p>Papua</p> <p>West Papua**</p>		

to success. Window A was built on the notion that all strategies and plans must be “problem driven”. It guided jurisdictions towards a final product that identifies what the jurisdiction plans to do to address the drivers of deforestation and achieve its targets in the context of the jurisdiction’s particular situation, how it will build a process to implement this, and why the identified approach will be effective. Window A was built on the notion that all strategies and plans must be “problem driven”. It guided jurisdictions towards a final product that identifies **what** the jurisdiction plans to do to address the drivers of deforestation and achieve its targets in the context of the jurisdiction’s particular situation, **how** it will build a process to implement this, and **why** the identified approach will be effective.

At the same time, when designing this initiative, the global partnership made up of the Government of Norway, the GCFTF Secretariat, and UNDP, recognised that the timeframe and resources would not allow for all states to develop fully-fledged strategies and plans but that Window A funding would make a valuable contribution to building the enabling conditions for reducing deforestation and promoting low-emissions development. Amazonas, Maranhão, Roraima, At the same time, when designing this initiative, the global partnership made up of the Government of Norway, the GCFTF Secretariat, and UNDP, recognised that the timeframe and resources would not allow for all states to develop fully-fledged strategies and plans but that Window A funding would make a valuable contribution to building the enabling conditions for reducing deforestation and promoting low-emissions development. Amazonas, Maranhão, Roraima, Papua, and North Kalimantan all made important progress in establishing the frameworks for a functioning REDD+ system but did not finalise a strategy document. Caquetá and Tocantins used the funds to support pilot REDD+ actions to test low-emissions development models that complemented existing efforts to develop REDD+ strategies in these states.

In addition, the guidance for Window A suggested that successful jurisdictional approaches should aim for three broad outcomes:

Mobilize and align capabilities across multiple government departments and programs to achieve higher implementation effectiveness. An intersectoral approach should extend beyond the Environment Secretariat by both bringing other government departments into the REDD+ policy-making process while also mainstreaming REDD+ into other strategic, regional planning frameworks.

Enhance learning and knowledge generation which can be captured in the programme’s monitoring, reporting, and evaluation arrangements and adaptive management system. The objective was for the GCFTF network to become a hub of knowledge and information sharing that could enrich jurisdictional approaches, promote south-south learning, and facilitate the scaling of successful pilots.

Increase cost efficiency, political leverage, and capacity to manage risks. A jurisdictional approach in support of a meta strategy should bring a shared vision to planning that mobilises stakeholders and aligns jurisdictional initiatives in a way that attracts and consolidates funding and allows for collective monitoring of activities and results.



Photo by: UN-REDD Programme Image Banks

INSIGHTS & LESSONS LEARNED

The following section outlines the key findings from Window A activities. This section is based on final reports and independent evaluations from the 35 jurisdictions as well as broader reflections on these results within the context of a wealth of recent reviews on jurisdictional approaches and the goals outlined by the GCFTF partnership in the Window A concept note.

One of the principal findings from the review was the need for targeted, consistent capacity building support to civil servants, institutions, and civil society in subnational jurisdictions. This finding is not new to development programming, nor is it specific to environmental governance or REDD+. Indeed, it was recognised in the guiding concept note for Window A and is a pillar of the UNDP approach. UNDP defines capacity development as “the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time. Capacity development is fundamentally about unlocking transformative change: change that is generated, guided, and sustained by those whom it is meant to benefit.”³ This same development pillar underpins UNDP’s support to jurisdictional approaches, including Window A. Many of the risks and objectives identified in the original concept note can be traced back to the need for competent and capable civil servants and institutions, whose skills should have been improved through Window A. Subnational government capacity is not only important for the design of effective strategies and investment plans but also the government’s ability to implement and to be able to attract potential donors or private sector to invest in REDD+ actions. It is the key to sustainability of jurisdictional approaches. Yet as was demonstrated again by Window A, this capability requires consistent and sustained support from partners working hand-in-hand with individual civil servants and institutions. In practice, all too often, consultants come and go while capabilities are not transferred to civil servants, who are not integrated into the work and as a result neither increase their capacity nor feel a sense ownership over results.

Many of the other findings in this review are similarly known to development practitioners. The need to set realistic expectations and to embed specific interventions into larger development processes were also highlighted in the Window A concept note. These and other success factors identified in the findings from Window A provide case studies from which to draw best practices and lessons learned that enrich the literature on jurisdictional development processes while also providing further inputs to improve development planning and implementation by members of the GCFTF or other subnational governments.

Setting realistic expectations

When funding window A was designed, it was with the knowledge that the 35 GCFTF members reflected a diversity of starting positions in terms of previous

³ UNDP. 2009. “Supporting Capacity Development: the UNDP approach”



Photo by: UN-REDD Programme Image Banks

REDD+ work, as well as varying levels of capacity, and distinct local contexts that would have a significant impact on what they could realistically achieve in 18 – 24 months. Each proposal was informed by a self-evaluation that aimed to take stock of what programs and processes were already in place as well as the capacity of the jurisdiction and their partner to deliver.

However, these guidelines also assumed that although the implementation timeframe was short, these jurisdictions would benefit from the wealth of REDD+ experience accumulated at national and subnational levels over the last decade and could ‘leapfrog’ some of the early planning stages. The hypothesis posited that GCFTF members would benefit from the national-level forest monitoring data and REDD+ systems already in place and could focus on the policy-making itself. Instead, this did not unfold as expected, for several reasons.

An important factor is that effective REDD+ strategies should be informed by multistakeholder processes, which take time to establish and are geographically specific. The actors engaged in a national REDD+ multistakeholder process are not necessarily the same, while local communities and local Indigenous groups in particular can be more engaged in subnational processes. Indeed, one of the comparative advantages of a subnational approach is the proximity of subnational governments to local actors. At the national level, for example, Indigenous communities may be represented by an umbrella national or regional body. A national-level stakeholder process cannot meaningfully involve as many smallholders or individuals or local businesses in the way that a subnational process can. However, it takes time to identify and build trust among these different stakeholder groups and additional safeguards must be established, particularly when engaging with Indigenous and local communities.

The trust and leadership of subnational governments also takes time to establish

and re-establish across the inevitable political cycles and turnover of key civil servants. In late 2018, 22 jurisdictions held elections, which in most cases resulted in a change of Governor and staff (including GCFTF delegates). Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico also held presidential elections, which brought about massive political change in Brazil and Mexico, affecting 16 GCFTF jurisdictions.

Another factor is that many subnational governments are consistently understaffed and under-skilled. These capacity gaps cannot be leapfrogged easily nor quickly. Several partners used Window A funds to provide technical REDD+ training to civil servants, designing courses in REDD+ basics as well as providing more advanced training on social and environmental standards and gender. The divergent capabilities of technical staff were reflected in the political will, interest, and capacity to take ownership over REDD+ activities under Window A and present a serious challenge to the long-term durability of jurisdictional approaches.

Despite changes in government, low capacity, and the need to establish multi-stakeholder processes, some jurisdictions were more successful than others in the timeframe. One factor could be better links to national REDD+ processes and support from higher-capacity national partners. In Pastaza, the province became the first subnational government in Ecuador to develop a REDD+ implementation plan, which is an essential part of the decentralization of the national REDD+ strategy. As a result, the Government of Pastaza benefited from years of national REDD+ experience and results, while the provincial government and their civil society partners received support from national counterparts and the PROAmazonía program. This approach helped build civil servant capacity and understanding of REDD+ actions in Pastaza and still left the flexibility for the jurisdiction to develop one of the most innovative models under Window A – an implementation partnership with the seven Indigenous nationalities that occupy 93% of the provincial territory.

Persistent capability gaps require consistent support

Another guiding principle for Window A states that jurisdictions should be able to determine their own pathway as subnational governments are in the best position to identify their own needs and to address the drivers of deforestation in a manner that is context specific. As a result, Window A allowed for an expansive flexibility in terms of approaches and activities that fit within the main themes of developing or improving jurisdictional strategies and investment plans. The resulting breadth of REDD+ and LED policy-making activities was evidence of this approach. The provinces of West Papua, Papua, Central Kalimantan, and West Kalimantan combined provincial-level planning with strengthening governance and business planning at the district level through the Forest Management Units (FMUs) which are the locus of forest governance in Indonesia. In Brazil, REDD+ pioneers Acre and Mato Grosso focused on updating and improving specific aspects of their REDD+ systems. In Acre, the new subprograms focused on

climate change regulation and biodiversity, while in Mato Grosso the Indigenous REDD+ program responded to the social inclusion gaps in their REDD+ system. In Peru, the seven regions (Amazonas, Huánuco, Loreto, Piura, San Martín, Ucayali and Madre de Dios) carried out a detailed analysis of drivers of deforestation and bottlenecks to low-emissions development (LED) before designing their LED strategies and investment plans. While in Mexico, Jalisco, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Campeche, Chiapas and Oaxaca all benefited from years of REDD+ activities and used the funds under Window A to update their REDD+ strategies and investment plans with a focus on local environmental governance and sustainable production.

Yet the persistent capability gaps – a risk identified in the concept note – often meant that partners and jurisdictions struggled to realise their vision and would have benefited from additional technical support from the GCFTF partnership on both technical and operational issues. Additional guidance from GCFTF global partners could have helped some jurisdictions to narrow their very broad and ambitious vision to focus more strategically on REDD+ policies and goals that would be achievable in 18 months and would have greater impact and durability. Tabasco was one of the few states that successfully designed, validated, and received legal approval for a REDD+ strategy in the timeframe. This was in part due to the highly focused nature of activities, which centred on a single goal.

Some Brazilian states took a very ambitious approach to developing REDD+ systems that remain unfinished and will require significant additional funds and technical support to be finalised, including Maranhão and Roraima. Actions could have been better targeted towards helping states become eligible for results-based finance from national or international sources, for example in alignment with the requirements outlined by the national government and REDD+ commission, CONAREDD+. In Peru, only the Ucayali government has approved its LED strategy, while none of the regions has received the national approval required for strategies and plans to become recognised planning instruments. There is a risk that they will be dropped from the political agenda without consistent support and lobbying by civil society. Political instability and turnover at the national level in Peru has exacerbated this risk. In some Indonesian provinces, actions could have been better aligned to the policies and plans most likely to receive results-based payments as outlined by the Indonesian Environment Fund (BPD LH).

Strengthening capacity in planning and implementation

One of the principal objectives of Window A was to strengthen the capacity of subnational governments, specifically the civil servants who manage the daily design and implementation of actions to reduce deforestation and foster low-emissions development. It was difficult to evaluate the capacity attributable to Window A support, particularly given the diverse starting points of civil servants and governments, as well as the impact of external events including regional elections during this time. Some states experienced extremely high

turnover with the new administration, such as in Peru, which experienced a 95% turnover of the technical teams in the seven regions. Given that Governors can only serve a single, four-year term in Peru, this is an enormous challenge for regional governments to build and maintain the capacity required to implement low-emissions development actions. States in Brazil that have a career public service, such as Mato Grosso, were less impacted by the electoral cycle as experienced civil servants were able to maintain REDD+ programs. In Mexico, states that have a breadth of experienced technical professionals such as Jalisco, were better able to weather the turnover as new staff came with REDD+ knowledge, experience, and commitment. That said, establishing trust and buy-in from outside the environment sector was still a challenge as new civil servants started in other departments. Jalisco's REDD+ focal points were faced with the challenge of creating joint ownership with the Jalisco Agricultural and Rural Development Secretariat where technical teams did not have the same understanding or commitment to REDD+.

Another important lesson is that capacity building occurs in both formal and informal ways. Many Window A civil society partners only reported the specific, formal training as 'results', such as REDD+ workshops and training modules. Yet the essential planning and implementation skills are also transferred 'on the job', that is through close collaboration on the policy design and activities themselves. As such, it is critical to involve civil servants in the policy design process itself and understand why limited capacity transfer occurs if technical staff are only involved in a final review. In Campeche, despite delays and governance challenges, the collaborative design of ecological development plans at the municipal level genuinely strengthened the capabilities of local government. A close working relationship can boost the informal transfer of skills on a daily basis as does genuine collaboration on policy design and implementation. This kind of capacity building can also mitigate against the risk of strategies and plans being abandoned once a grant ends as there are civil servants with the skills and commitment to continue. Conversely, a strategy designed by a consultant or civil society partner in isolation is a lost opportunity to transfer capabilities and ensure longer-term ownership.

Put another way, not all capacity-related support results in capacity development. Meeting an immediate development need, while valuable, does not always meet the long-term capacity needs that will bolster the sustainability of actions and ensure effective implementation or governance of strategies designed. In East Kalimantan, the province used Window A funding to address very specific funding gaps in its low-emissions strategy, which resulted in increased financing for activities but which evaluators found had no real impact on the capabilities of provincial government.

Success factors for jurisdictional approaches

The most successful Window A approaches exemplified the success factors that have been identified by many practitioners in the literature on jurisdictional approaches, including strong government leadership, intersectoral planning

and implementation, and multistakeholder approaches.⁴ Success does not always mean a fully-consulted, finalised strategy and investment plan in 18 months but instead that credible processes have been built and that civil servants have taken ownership. The following section provides examples of how and where these success factors were best articulated in the GCFTF.

Strong government leadership: The Governors' Climate & Forests Task Force is built on the concept of Governor-level leadership. However, while participation in high-level events is often attractive, leadership in REDD+ policy is not always guaranteed. Brazilian and Peruvian states consistently enjoyed Governor-level support, while Governors in Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria were consistently absent. A true jurisdictional program is more successful with Governor level support and has been cited as an important factor in the success of Mato Grosso and Acre. In the case of Acre, the incoming Governor that was not (initially) supportive of REDD+, which caused delays in implementation and threatened the decade of REDD+ success. Participation in the GCFTF has, however, increased the Governor's understanding and support for these processes. Strong leadership can also come from the Secretary level (the subnational equivalent of a Minister) as evidenced in Brazil and Mexico. This leadership is more effective where the Secretary has technical capacity and interest in the environmental and REDD+ agenda, such as the state of Jalisco, which has leveraged its REDD+ technical capacity and framework to explore new opportunities in the voluntary and compliance carbon markets. In Brazil, Environment Secretaries have taken an important leadership role in the GCFTF. Still, their technical engagement and support for the development of REDD+ strategies has been patchier.

The strength of government institutions and their leaders is also relevant. The role of the provincial climate change body, DPPI in East Kalimantan and its leader, GCFTF Delegate Prof Daddy Ruchiyat, have been credited with the province's success in accessing results-based finance through the Forest Carbon Partnership Fund. During Window A, several provinces cited the DPPI as a model for their own jurisdictional REDD+ approaches. In an evaluation of Amapá, several interviewees recognised the leadership of GCFTF Delegate, Mariane Nardi as critical in moving the REDD+ and climate agenda forward in the state.

Cross-sectoral policy alignment – moving REDD+ beyond the environment sector: The benefits of an intersectoral approach are outlined in the Window A guidance (above) as mobilizing and aligning capabilities across multiple government departments and programs to achieve higher implementation effectiveness. One of the lessons of over ten years of national REDD+ actions is that success is reinforced by a broad coalition of actors and institutions.

⁴ Dozens of reports and analyses on jurisdictional approaches have been published in the last eight years. Examples include: A. Fishman, E. Oliveira, and L. Gamble. 2017. "Tackling Deforestation Through a Jurisdictional Approach: Lessons from the field". WWF. W. Boyd, et al. 2018. "Jurisdictional Approaches to REDD+ and Low Emissions Development: Progress and Prospects." Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute; L. Hovani, R. Cortez, H. Hartanto, I. Thompson, G. Fishbein, J. Adams, E. Myers Madeira. 2018. "The Role of Jurisdictional Programs in Catalyzing Sustainability Transitions in Tropical Forest Landscapes". The Nature Conservancy, Arlington, VA, USA; P. Umunay, L. Lujan, C. Meyer, J. Cobián. "Trifecta of Success for Reducing Commodity-Driven Deforestation: Assessing the Intersection of REDD+ Programs, Jurisdictional Approaches, and Private Sector Commitments". 2018. *Forests* 9(10), 609.

Indeed, intersectoral approaches serve several functions. They increase the chance of broad-spectrum political support for REDD+ /LED policies and are essential for implementation as true jurisdictional programs rely on a cross-section of government support and financing. In Oaxaca, the establishment of the Intersectoral Restoration Roundtable was considered one of the most important Window A results as it promotes genuine intersectoral discussions about the REDD+ agenda in the state. Peru exemplified the all-encompassing, umbrella approach to LED planning, with huge numbers of government departments involved. In San Martín, nine general managers and thirteen regional bureaus were involved in the LED task force.

Intersectoral processes also mitigate the impact of political turnover. In Maranhão, four different Secretaries of Environment presided over the project, making it extremely difficult to establish a government-led process. However, an intersectoral working body in the state was able to move the REDD+ work forward in the meantime and to mitigate the impact of administrative change.

It is important to note that these intersectoral task forces and working groups need to engage in the policy design process itself. In Jalisco, cooperation between the Environmental Secretariat (SEMADET) and Agricultural and Rural Development (SADER) was critical in changing the regulations around cattle subsidies, largely thanks to raising SADER's awareness of the impact of cattle ranching in forest areas and the political will of both departments to mitigate its effects. That said, the challenge remains to get their buy-in to the implementation of policies.

Mainstreaming REDD+ in jurisdictional planning: Bringing a broad spectrum of actors into the REDD+ policy process is an important but insufficient condition for successful jurisdictional programs. Instead, successful states also actively promote REDD+ in other economic development and planning processes. In the case of Roraima, the principal objective was to develop a jurisdictional REDD+ system for the state. However, civil servants also contributed to the inclusion of REDD+ in the state's new development strategy, 'Roraima 2030', and the first plan under this strategy, 'Roraima AgroEnvironmental'. Mato Grosso's successful Produce, Conserve, Include program is one of the most cited examples of genuine, jurisdictional REDD+ programming. Window A initiatives focused on better engagement of Indigenous peoples in REDD+, an area that had been found lacking in independent evaluations of Mato Grosso's REDD+ actions. In Amapá, the strength of the civil servants leading the jurisdictional REDD+ process was catalytic in garnering greater support for the environmental agenda at the governor level. In Indonesia, including REDD+ aspects in the medium- and long-term provincial development plans was an important strategy for mainstreaming environmental concepts.

Multistakeholder approaches are essential for trust and effective implementation: The need for multistakeholder processes has almost become a cliché, appearing in every lessons-learned section of every jurisdictional approaches report and the benefits of multistakeholder processes are well-known. However, it is worth focusing on the specific aspects of these processes in the 35 GCFTF member jurisdictions that ensured they were successful and can inform jurisdictional approaches in



*Photo: Naturaleza y Cultura Internacional
Province, Pastaza.*

tropical forest countries in future initiatives:

- **Simplified language:** The REDD+ agenda can be a complex and jargon-fuelled space. It is essential to translate these concepts into language that is accessible for target stakeholders as well as a broader public to ensure meaningful participation and community support for REDD+ actions. Additional capacity building for stakeholders to bring them up to a level where they can meaningfully participate improves the quality of multi-stakeholder buy-in, whether it be women, young people, Indigenous and local communities, quilombolas, extrativistas or smallholder communities. Cross River State has spent years working on community-level REDD+ to the stage where forest communities see REDD+ as a priority and connect forest conservation to both local livelihoods and identity.
- **Communication methods:** In areas where literacy is low, printed materials may be insufficient for educating stakeholders and requesting their opinion. In Amazonas, Brazil, workshop organisers found that participants were not completing the written post-meeting surveys that had been provided due to lack of literacy. Instead, they began to speak to each participant at the end of the workshop to get their feedback.
- **Consistent follow-up:** In Madre de Dios, a stakeholder mapping exercise identified 36 native communities and five major Indigenous organisations to engage in the design and development of the LED strategy. Organisers found that regular phone calls were required to ensure representatives participated in workshops as well as their technical teams.
- **Interpretation and facilitation:** When working with Indigenous communities in particular, translation and interpretation services, as well as local facilitators, encouraged active participation and engagement (see more on Peru's approach under Case Study I).

Strategies will be more effective and durable if embedded into policy and legal frameworks: Any REDD+/LED strategy or investment plan must be embedded in the legal and policy framework of the jurisdiction if it is to be effective. When strategies and plans are an integral part of policies and planning (enshrined in laws and regulations) they are more difficult to undo. In states where strategies were passed into law or regulation during the implementation period, there is now a framework for future funding and action. In states where draft laws are still pending review by state-level assemblies, the question remains whether and if they will be approved without the funding to support lobbying by CSO partners or to support the civil servant champions who are already stretched, or Secretaries of Environment who have competing priorities, including upcoming federal elections in the case of Brazil.

The Window A processes were tested in almost all states and provinces when 22 administrations changed in late 2018/early 2019. In some cases, significant resources were required to renew government interest and ownership though these efforts were facilitated by strong existing institutional structures. In Acre, one of the REDD+ pioneers and founding member of GCFTF, the change in government represented a potential departure from the previous decade of environmental action. However, with REDD+ institutions in place (the Climate Change Institute – IMC and the CDSA – the body responsible for environmental services), the political task of helping the new Governor recognise the economic development benefits of REDD+ was supported by the existing legal and policy framework. This is the greatest risk in states that were unable to complete their REDD+ frameworks in the 18 – 24-month timeframe (including Maranhão, Papua, Roraima) as without additional financial support to ensure they are approved by state legislatures nor guaranteed funding for implementation, their future is far more fragile. Yet where the multistakeholder and technical working groups have been established by law, there is now a framework for continuing the process. In Aceh, for example, the LED strategy task force was established by a Governors’ Decree, which gave it greater credibility and stability. A similar approach was successful in West Kalimantan.

Private sector engagement strategies were critical to attract financing to jurisdictional REDD+ actions: Public-private partnerships are not the only form of implementing partnerships, however, their nascent success in West Kalimantan and Pará are encouraging. The financing potential of the private sector is undeniable, along with its role in supporting REDD+ implementation yet even in the most successful states, private sector engagement requires continued attention. Pará consolidated its public-private partnership under a voluntary protocol for cattle-ranchers and cold-store industries, which includes hundreds of large and small companies, including Marfrig and Frigol. This partnership is integral to the cattle-traceability system that the state has tested in the southern municipality of São Felix do Xingú. Despite this success locally, the evaluation found that private sector actors felt undervalued in the climate change forum, which serves as a state-level stakeholder platform.

West Kalimantan has attracted private sector investment for several REDD+ initiatives, including an US\$8M coconut facility. The facility is currently under review by the Tropical Landscapes Financing Facility (TLFF), a blended-finance mechanism supported by BNP Paribas, ICRAF, UN Environment, and ADM Capital. Unilever has agreed to be the offtaker (purchasing what is produced at the facility), while other investors were waiting for COVID-19 restrictions to ease in order to visit the site. Similarly, a proposal to the &Green Fund (a blended-finance mechanism supported by NICFI, Unilever, UN Environment, GEF, and the Dutch bank FMO) is in the field-level impact assessment phase. In both cases, these are project-level implementations that will contribute to the province's low-emissions targets and support local livelihoods. Yet this type of private sector engagement also requires significant capacity building. Evaluators noted that the West Kalimantan government needed serious support from civil society partners to identify and secure private sector investment, including the development of business plans and proposals, facilitating introductions to investors and donors, and managing a private-sector strategy with limited support or input from government.

This underscores the need for capacity development across all facets of REDD+ and LED planning and execution, including public-private partnerships as well as better links with existing private-sector-focused initiatives. Still, the focus of Window was on the development of the strategies and investment plans, rather than large-scale private sector engagement. In many cases, the additional work to develop a financing strategy and implement it – including fostering entirely new relationships for many governments – was beyond the scope of Window A as well as beyond the timescale and funding available.

More technical assistance is required to get from gender theory to action:

All 35 jurisdictions were supported to incorporate gender into their results and monitoring frameworks, activities, and budgets for Window A. This included bringing on a gender specialist to make these revisions and in several cases this person also provided training to civil society and CSO partners on how to mainstream gender in REDD+ actions, how to implement gender-sensitive activities, and how to monitor and evaluate the results. However, despite the studies and revisions made, gender outcomes were mixed and very few strategies or plans were gender sensitive or gender responsive. The reasons for this were similar across the network: gender consultants were brought on early in the implementation of activities and revisions were made but with little follow-up which meant gender was not being monitored throughout and that gender was not adequately reflected in many of the resulting strategies and plans. Moreover, there was insufficient capacity (or commitment) in project management teams and government to take on this role.

The most commonly reported gender activity was participation in meetings and workshops, which alone does not guarantee that gender will be taken into account in policy design. In addition, women's participation in activities across Window A was generally lower than the 30% considered the minimum for gender sensitive action (40% being the accepted UNDP target). Very few states monitored the nature of participation – whether it was active and whether it changed the outcome of the design, validation, or implementation of policies or activities. Some bright spots occurred where states and provinces recognised these low participation rates and adopted corrective measures. In Aceh, after the first round of workshops, organisers noted that only nine women had participated, of which only two spoke during the meetings and only one was recorded as having any impact on the outcome or decision-making of the meeting. As a result, they organised separate meetings for women around thematic areas, which increased women's participation to approximately 36% overall. While this is lower than the province's target of 50% it was much higher than the baseline, emphasising the importance of recording baselines at the outset to be able to measure progress and adjust as necessary. This is a lesson learned for future initiatives.

In Aceh, it is important to note, gender mainstreaming has been mandated into regional policy through Governor's Decree (95/2019), which makes it compulsory to consult both women and men in all regional planning processes. This was one outcome of a decade-long effort that began with the creation of a women's working group in the province in 2010.

Women's leadership in REDD+ was also recognised as an important factor, for example the appointment of Ibu Yenny Almuthahar as Head of the Forestry Department and her leadership in the REDD+ Pokja (working group) in West Kalimantan was recognised as a factor in promoting gender mainstreaming in Window A activities. In Papua, over 40% of participants across the initiative were women, with some activities attracting over 50%. The reasons cited include a solid understanding of gender by all project managers and the presence of women in important project management roles, which ensured that enough women were invited to participate and that there was a safe space for consultations. Where gender targets were not met, the partners worked with government officials to reconsider their approach, including a minimum of 30% women invited to all meetings, big or small. Gender sensitivity was explained to all consultants and staff hired by the project and reinforced during coordination meetings.

However, in many jurisdictions, it was the workshops or training on gender that attracted the highest female participation, which skewed overall participation rates and was another important factor in the lack of gender responsive strategies. In Chiapas, for example, women's participation ranged from 13 – 38% in meetings and workshops although in workshops on gender, two-thirds of participants were women. What this means is that men are not benefitting from a greater understanding of gender while women's participation is confined largely to discussions about gender rather than bringing their perspective to a broader discussion about the roles of women and men in forest conservation, sustainable production, or REDD+ policies, or ensuring that women and men benefit equitably from any REDD+ measures.



Photo by: Jaime Dantas, Unsplash

A key finding from Window A was that closer monitoring and support yields results. In Peru, when region of Madre de Dios noticed that women's participation was low, they reached out to groups that work with forest users to identify women leaders to be invited to participate. As a result, they achieved 43% women's participation overall. The Brazilian state of Mato Grosso increased women's participation from 27% - 50% in activities overall and as a result, gender was one of the nine central themes of the Indigenous REDD+ subprogram developed. However, the evaluation noted that in workshops with Indigenous communities that were not explicitly about gender issues, women's participation dropped to 30%, a figure that is too low to meet gender sensitivity standards. These results were repeated across jurisdictions, at least in cases where good data was kept, noting that Indigenous women's participation was lower than non-Indigenous women's participation, meaning that even greater support is required to reach women in vulnerable and marginalised groups. Additional oversight and targeted technical support, including tools and training, will be provided to Window B to ensure gender is mainstreamed throughout activities, that full and active participation is the norm, and that both women and men are positively impacted by jurisdictional REDD+ actions.

The intersectionality of gender was an aspect that was relatively underexplored or reported during the implementation. All 35 GCFTF jurisdictions have diverse populations, including Indigenous or other local and traditional communities, many of whom require a different approach. In Rondônia, despite achieving 50% female participation in consultations on the draft environmental services law, they still struggled to include Indigenous and quilombola women, particularly outside of specific safeguards workshops. This was reflected in many Brazilian states, where it was noted that engagement with traditional communities had improved but still had a long way to go. Case Study I and Case Study II provide more examples from Peru and Brazil.

Among those jurisdictions with more success in actively engaging women, best practices included: separate groups for men and women, providing childcare spaces for participants, speaking to women instead of requesting written feedback, providing local translators and facilitators to bridge linguistic and cultural barriers, ensuring the times and days of meetings are convenient for women with family responsibilities, having women in leadership and management roles, and working with local groups to specifically identify female participants and consistent, individual follow-up to ensure they attend.

I. Case Study: Engaging Indigenous Peoples in LED Policy Design

The regions of Peru realised early on the importance of engaging Indigenous peoples in the design of their LED strategies and investment plans in a way that was accessible. For each workshop, the project hired local interpreters and facilitators to ensure that materials were communicated in the local language, and that participants were encouraged to be actively engaged in a safe space, particularly Indigenous women. Strategies to engage Indigenous communities included telephone calls to invite specific representatives in communities with limited internet/telecommunications access; conversations with Indigenous leaders to promote participation; work with specialists validated by communities. For example in Huánuco, the government engaged with national Indigenous peoples organisations (AIDSESEP, ONAMIAP &

CONAP) and coordinated meetings with FECONAPIA (Federación de Comunidades Nativas de Puerto Inca y Afluentes), ANAP (Asociación de Nacionalidades Ashaninkas del Pichis), UNAY (Unión de Nacionalidades Ashaninka Yánesha), FENACOKA (Federación Nacional de Comunidades Kakataibo), FECONAYA (Federación de Comunidades Nativas Yánesha), ensuring participation of representations from these community organisations in the workshops who understand the culture and language. Unfortunately, despite this important effort, Ucayali is the only region in Peru that has approved the LED strategy at the time of writing.

II. Case Study: Mainstreaming gender in REDD+ Policy

Amazonas presents a model of best practice in how to engage women in REDD+ planning and design. Their first step to ensure gender was taken into consideration in the development of a jurisdictional REDD+ system was to establish that a gender expert was available to accompany all actions. Second, Amazonas undertook a review of existing policies to understand the gender gaps. The analysis identified gaps, including the integration of women from Indigenous and local communities, and highlighted ways to increase gender representation in the policy-making process without increasing costs. This included the disaggregation of data in baselines and monitoring based on data disaggregated by sex and community. They emphasised the need for inclusive language, for example the roles and contributions of both women and men in agriculture and small businesses, and recommended that sustainable production and business projects guarantee at least 30% of beneficiaries are women. They also emphasised the need to include gender in fundraising and financing strategies. From here, they developed a gender action plan to mainstream gender in the REDD+ strategy, which highlighted the principles of transparency and inclusiveness, including the need for both women and men to be involved in any Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) processes. In developing and implementing this strategy, they noted the importance of raising the capacity of project implementors who may not have the requisite knowledge and understanding of gender issues.

In the six safeguards workshops carried out across the state, 44% of participants were women (292 people in total). One of the many reasons they were able to guarantee women's participation was by providing childcare for participants. Organisers also conducted semi-structured interviews with participants after the workshops after noticing that literacy levels made written surveys difficult to complete. They also found that it allowed the organisers to build trust with participants, who were more willing to share their opinions in spoken form.

In a state such as Amazonas, with a large population represented by Indigenous peoples and local communities, they adopted an intersectional approach to gender to ensure that these additional inequalities were also taken into account.

Find more information on incorporating gender in Amazonas' REDD+ strategy in [English](#), [Spanish](#) and [Portuguese](#)

BOTTLENECKS

Window A implementation was not without its challenges. Despite the heterogeneous nature of the subnational network, the different levels of capacity, and varying starting points, the bottlenecks were often similar across the jurisdictions.

Government capacity

One of the principal objectives of Window A was to build the capacity of civil servants in REDD+ policy making and implementation thus it is no surprise that weak government capacity was also a principal challenge. In Peru, the evaluators found that low capacity would remain a significant obstacle to sustainability of actions, with civil servants lacking the technical knowledge and experience in designing and implementing REDD+ actions. As noted above, this is in part due to a fragile civil service which experiences a 95% turnover every four years as governors can only be elected to a single term. Even if some of the same civil servants are cycling in and out of government, it is difficult to maintain continuity and capacity under those conditions.

Smaller and newer states also suffered more than larger and more established ones. North Kalimantan was only formed in 2012, while the two Ivorian states, Cavally and Bélier were established in 2011. These provinces and regions had some of the weakest capacity and most limited understanding of REDD+. North Kalimantan should have benefited from greater peer-level exchange with more advanced Indonesian provinces as well as stronger links to established national REDD+ processes. In Côte d'Ivoire, the region of Cavally in particular could have benefitted from integration into landscape-level processes focused on building a more sustainable cocoa industry as well as initiatives such as the Cacao & Forests Initiative. Connecting their regional REDD+ strategies to the national REDD+ Strategy and Nationally-Determined Contributions (NDC) will also help to build capacity provided that civil servants are genuinely engaged in these processes. The risk in this case is that international non-government organisations and private sector actors fail to engage local government sufficiently, precisely due to their perceived low capabilities.

Limited Resources

Window A funding was never designed to be a long-term, development program but to provide a short, targeted insertion of funds to help states build the foundation to be able to attract more significant financing, through results-based payments, grants, public-private partnerships or other sources. Yet almost all states found the resources too few and the timeframe too short to effect transformation. The resource problem is linked to a lack of predictable and sufficient climate finance for subnational actors. A 2020 study by Earth Innovation Institute noted that the 2015 pledge to the GCFTF from the Government of Norway was the only funding received in direct response to Governors' request under the Rio Branco Declaration. As of 2020, only two jurisdictions have received results-based payments (Acre and Mato Grosso, through the REDD+ Early Movers Program). There is also a limited capacity on the part of civil servants and their partners to access significant sources of funding. Funding will need to come from a diverse range of sources, from domestic financing tools, to results-based payments, to public-private partnerships. UNDP will continue to provide tools and support to access these different sources of funds.



Photo by: Seyiram Kweku, Unsplash

This obstacle is also linked to unrealistic expectations. In an effort to garner high-level support, well-meaning public servants may have oversold the impact of the funding under Window A, which at US\$400,000 maximum per jurisdiction is unlikely to be transformative. It could also be the limited resources available were not targeted to the actions or policies most likely to have the greatest impact in terms of attracting additional funds in the form of grants, loans, results-based finance, or public-private partnerships. As discussed above, this is where jurisdictions would have benefited from greater technical support from the global GCFTF partnership, including UNDP, in shaping and implementing their REDD+ vision to ensure the greatest impact.

Competing priorities

While the COVID-19 pandemic became an all-consuming priority towards the end of implementation competing priorities are not unique to the GCFTF. The environmental agenda has had to compete with social and economic development agendas that have focused on extractive industries and unsustainable production practices. Subnational jurisdictions are also subject to politics and policies at the national level. In Mexico, the incoming federal administration cut the environmental budget by over 60%. In Brazil, new policies, legislation, and budget cuts have contributed to rising deforestation in states.

One of the opportunities coming out of Window A is to target the REDD+ and LED strategies as integral to a “greener” post-COVID-19 recovery and to demonstrate the value of REDD+ in supporting social and economic development rather than undermining it. In Acre, an incoming governor was elected on a platform of massive agricultural expansion. However, with support from the GCFTF, civil servants were able to demonstrate the economic value of the state’s environmental services and conservation model, which has had bearing on his political actions.

III. Case Study: Implementing partnerships with Indigenous Communities

Indigenous peoples occupy 93% of the territory in Pastaza, located deep in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Pastaza was the first province in the country to develop its REDD+ implementation plan, in line with the national REDD+ strategy but more importantly, has done so through a unique partnership with the seven Indigenous groups in the region (Shur, Achuar, Andwa, Sapara, Shiwiar, Waorani, Kichwa). The Provincial Government of Pastaza signed agreements with CONFENIAE (Federation of Indigenous Peoples of the Ecuadorian Amazon) and the seven nationalities to implement REDD+ actions. The provincial government began its design of the REDD+ strategy by recognising the territorial plans (*planes de vida*) already developed by Indigenous communities themselves and by identifying a community representative to support technical accompaniment of the policy design. Each agreement identifies the priorities for the group and their commitment to collaborate on implementing REDD+ actions.

DURABILITY

When asked whether the jurisdictional programs developed or improved through Window A are sustainable, states and partners invariably cite additional finance as the key to durability. Several of the states developed investment plans, inked new partnerships, and explored options for domestic and international financing. However very few were successful in securing this finance for REDD+ actions. In part this is a question of the short timeframe in which Window A was implemented (18 – 24 months) but it is also a question of the financing mechanisms available to a state government, their capacity to access, and the perceptions of international would-be funders. From the private sector's perspective, issues of risk, project size, and returns on investment are paramount. The question is what factors helped some states or provinces be more successful in this area.

In East Kalimantan, for example, the province increased its allocation from the Restoration Fund by 37.5% in 2020, an achievement for which they credit the support from Window A. Mato Grosso's decade-long REDD+ planning and implementation has resulted in several sources of REDD+ financing, results-based payments, grants, and loans, and is secure in its implementation for years to come. Others are less fortunate. Some have secured grant funding, such as Pará, where Partnerships 4 Forests is co-funding the development of the cattle-traceability system. In Cross River State and West Kalimantan, proposals to the Green Climate Fund have a good chance of success, while Cavally is one of the landscapes in a national proposal to the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

The finance question cannot be ignored and one of the Window A objectives was to support states to build the conditions that would make them more attractive to donors or other sources of finance. Again, the capabilities of states and the short timeframe contributed to this failure as well as external factors. Several blended finance facilities, which were targeted by jurisdictions have struggled to sign deals with private sector.

Other innovative financing mechanisms simply take time to develop and garner support, even more so in a year marked by a global health crisis.

IV. Case Study: Linking Jurisdictional Approaches to National REDD+ Frameworks

Linking the state level processes into national frameworks can save resources and build national-level support. In Bélier and Cavally, the REDD+ strategies developed in these two young regions are linked directly to the national-level REDD+ strategy. Indeed, each responds to one of the national strategy's central pillars: in Bélier the focus is on restoration of forests and degraded areas, while in Cavally, the focus is on sustainable production and conservation of remaining forests. This ensures that any actions will align with national-level processes and can facilitate any links to national-level goals, including Côte d'Ivoire's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). Côte d'Ivoire has attracted significant attention from private sector actors in the cocoa sector through partnerships such as the Cocoa and Forests Initiative, however progress has been slow. UNDP has continued to support the connection of Bélier and Cavally to these initiatives as well as national programmes supported by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to link these subnational policies into national frameworks and potential financing opportunities.

CONCLUSIONS

The funding under Window A was critical in supporting the GCFTF members to develop or update their REDD+ planning and finance tools yet fell short of being transformative in most jurisdictions. This is not a failure of Window A but rather a reflection of the challenging context in which subnational planning occurs. A short timeframe and limited resources, combined with widespread administrative turnover and COVID-19 during the important validation period, made it exceptionally challenging. Many of these risks were identified by the GCFTF from the beginning and the expectation of the global partnership was that states and provinces would utilise Window A to make significant advances, with both start and end points dictated by their capacity and unique context.

However, while many strategies and investment plans as well as supporting laws and policies were drafted and finalised during this time, very few were formally approved or adopted. Annex I lists the relevant policies and laws developed under Window A along with their current status. Without the continued support and lobbying of subnational governments there is a risk that these strategies will be forgotten among the competing priorities, particularly as COVID-19 response and recovery remains the top priority in many jurisdictions but also as political turnover continues in the coming years.

The findings from Window A point to several positive outcomes from the two-year initiative. They also confirm many of the lessons from other development programs, including the centrality of capacity development to successful outcomes. From policy design, to multistakeholder engagement, to financing and implementation of REDD+ actions, if subnational governments lack the capacity to drive these processes, they

cannot be sustained and will not lead to transformative change. The way in which partners think about capacity development and how it is incorporated into daily actions is a major lesson for the next phase of funding and activities. That is, beyond formal training sessions to think about how to be constantly transferring knowledge and skills to government counterparts by ensuring their meaningful engagement in and leadership of tasks, particularly at the civil servant level.

ANNEX 1:

LIST OF STRATEGIES, PLANS, LAWS DEVELOPED UNDER WINDOW A

The following table includes the policies, strategies and related laws developed under Window and their status.

Country	Jurisdiction	Strategies, plans, laws	Status
Brazil	Acre	Plano de Agronegócios de Baixas Emissões de Carbono do Estado do Acre	Draft
		ISA Sociobiodiversidade	Approved
		ISA Regulação do Clima	Approved
		Plano Estratégico para a Piscicultura no Acre	Draft
	Amapá	Política Estadual De Clima e Incentivos aos Serviços Ambientais do Estado Do Amapá (Sistema Estadual de Clima e Incentivos aos Serviços Ambientais)	Draft
	Amazonas	Lei de Serviços Ambientais	Under consideration by SEMA
		Minuta de Norma Regulamentadora do Subprograma de REDD+, do Programa de Clima e Carbono, Criado no Âmbito da Política do Estado do Amazonas de Serviços Ambientais	Draft
	Maranhão	Política de Redução de Emissões por Desmatamento e Degradação, Conservação, Manejo Florestal Sustentável, Manutenção e Aumento dos Estoques de Carbono Florestal (REDD+), da Gestão dos Ativos Ambientais e do Pagamento por Serviços Ambientais do Estado do Maranhão, denominada de Sistema Jurisdicional de REDD+ e PSA.	Draft
	Mato Grosso	Subprograma Territórios Indígenas REM/MT	Approved
	Pará	Amazônia Agora	Approved
	Rondônia	Estratégia Estadual de REDD+ do Estado de Rondônia	Approved

Country	Jurisdiction	Strategies, plans, laws	Status
		LEI N. 4.437, DE 17 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2018. Institui a Política Estadual de Governança Climática e Serviços Ambientais - PGSA e cria o Sistema Estadual de Governança Climática e Serviços Ambientais - SGSA, no âmbito do Estado de Rondônia e dá outras providências.	Approved
	Roraima	Índice de Norma de Serviços Ambientais e Redução de Emissões por Desmatamento e Degradação, Conservação, Manejo Florestal Sustentável, Manutenção e Aumento do Estoques de Carbono Florestal (REDD+) do Estado de Roraima	Draft
Mexico	Campeche	Planeación Municipal, Ordenamiento Ecológico y Programas Ambientales: Hacía una gestión óptima del territorio. Municipio de Campeche	Draft
		Planeación Municipal, Ordenamiento Ecológico y Programas Ambientales: Hacía una gestión óptima del territorio. Municipio de Champotón	Draft
		Planeación Municipal, Ordenamiento Ecológico y Programas Ambientales: Hacía una gestión óptima del territorio. Municipio de Hopelchén	Draft
	Chiapas	Plan Estatal de Inversiones: Para la Acción Climática en el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable de Chiapas	Draft
		Chiapas Visión 2030	Draft
	Jalisco	Plan Estatal de Inversión Como Acción para la Implementación de la Estrategia Estatal REDD+ Jalisco	Draft
	Quintana Roo	Plan de Intervención AMUSUR	Draft
	Tabasco	Estrategia estatal de Reducción de Emisiones por Deforestación y Degradación Forestal de Tabasco (EEREDD+ Tabasco)	Approved
	Yucatán	Programa de Ordenamiento Ecológico Local (POEL) del Municipio de Tzucacab	Draft
	Programa de Ordenamiento Ecológico Local (POEL) del Municipio de Santa Elena	Draft	

Country	Jurisdiction	Strategies, plans, laws	Status
Peru	Amazonas	Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Rural Bajo en Emisiones Región Amazonas	Finalised – awaiting approval
		Plan de Inversión	Finalised – awaiting approval
	Huánuco	Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Rural Bajo en Emisiones de Huánuco	Finalised – awaiting approval
		Plan de Inversión	Finalised – awaiting approval
	Loreto	Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Rural Bajo en Emisiones de Loreto	Finalised – awaiting approval
		Plan de Inversión	Finalised – awaiting approval
	Madre de Dios	Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Rural Bajo en Emisiones de Madre de Dios – Nuestra Tierra	Draft
	Piura	Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Rural Bajo en Emisiones de Piura	Finalised – awaiting approval
		Plan de Inversión	Finalised – awaiting approval
	San Martín	Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Rural Bajo en Emisiones de San Martín	Finalised – awaiting approval
		Plan de Inversión	Finalised – awaiting approval
	Ucayali	Estrategia Regional de Desarrollo Rural Bajo en Emisiones de Ucayali	Finalised – awaiting approval
		Plan de Inversión	Finalised – awaiting approval

Country	Jurisdiction	Strategies, plans, laws	Status
Ecuador	Pastaza	Plan de Implementación y Acciones REDD+ de Pastaza	Approved
Nigeria	Cross River State	Cross River State REDD+ Investment Plan: 2021 – 2050 investment period	Approved
Côte d'Ivoire	Bélier	Plan Stratégique Régionale de Restauration de Paysages Forestiers dans la Région de Bélier	Approved
	Cavally	Plan Stratégique de Production Agricole Zéro-déforestation de la Région de Cavally	Approved
Indonesia	Aceh	Integrated Low Emission Development Strategy in Aceh (ILEDSDA – Strategi Terpadu Pembangunan Rendah Emisi Aceh)	Finalised – awaiting approval
	Central Kalimantan	REDD+ Strategy Seruyan District	Final draft
	West Kalimantan	Mekanisme Pembagian Manfaat Dalam Kegiatan Pengurangan Emisi Dari Deforestasi Dan Degradasi Hutan Provinsi Kalimantan Barat	Final draft
		Penetapan Target Penurunan Emisi Dari Deforestasi Dan Degradasi Hutan Pada Kabupaten / Kota Se - Kalimantan Barat Tahun 2020 – 2030	Signed
		Perlindungan Dan Pengelolaan Ekosistem Gambut dan Mangrove	Final draft
		Pengelolaan Hutan Jangka Panjang di Kabupaten Kubu Raya oleh KPH Kubu Raya periode 2019-2028	Signed
		Mekanisme Penyaluran Dan Pengelolaan Dana Lingkungan Hidup Provinsi Kalimantan Barat	Final draft
	West Papua	REDD+ Strategy: The Province of West Papua	Approved